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INTRODUCTION: NORMATIVE LEGAL THEORY

W

HAT normative theory should guide the study of law? This
is the central question of contemporary legal theory—a
question that crosses disciplines and approaches. The question has
many variations. In public-law theory, the emphasis is usually on
normative legal theories that draw on political philosophy—
libertarianism, egalitarianism, and popular sovereignty come to
mind. In private-law theory, the emphasis has usually been on
comprehensive moral doctrines and, in particular, on the clashes
between fairness and welfare or between deontology and consequentialism.
In this Essay I shall argue that normative legal theory should be
shallow rather than deep. That is, I shall argue that normative
theorizing about public and private law should eschew reliance on
the deep premises of deontology or consequentialism and should
instead rely on what I shall call “public values”—values that can be
affirmed without relying on the deep and controversial premises of
particular comprehensive moral doctrines. The argument that I advance will begin with the idea of “public reason,” the common resources for deliberation and justification that are available to any
reasonable1 citizen in a pluralist and democratic society. My central
claim is that the ideal of public reason that is appropriate for a pluralist democracy gives public values, and not deep moral theories,
pride of place in the enterprise of normative theorizing about law.
This idea is given definition by an ideal of public legal reason—a
normative theory of the reasons that are appropriate for legal practice and for legal theory that aims to guide that practice.

1

The term “reasonable” is used here in a Rawlsian sense. See John Rawls, Political
Liberalism 48–54 (expanded ed. 2005). Rawls distinguishes between the “reasonable”
and the “rational.” Following Rawls, I will not attempt a definition. Persons are reasonable insofar as they recognize the idea of reciprocity and are willing “to propose
principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly,
given the assurance that others will likewise do so.” Id. at 49. Someone can be rational
in the pursuit of her own ends without being reasonable; a rational person could reject
the idea of reciprocity. Id. at 50.
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To give this abstract argument shape and context, I shall use a
more particular question to illustrate and test my arguments: what
normative legal theory is appropriate for theorizing about private
law under the conditions that prevail in contemporary pluralist
democracies? Although the examples that I use will be drawn
mostly from legal discourse in the Anglophone common-law world,
my claims are not limited to the United States and similar legal cultures—they extend, in theory, to any contemporary pluralist democracy. In analyzing this particular question, I shall use the contemporary debate between fairness and welfare (or
consequentialism and deontology) as my foil. That debate has recently been driven by an influential and controversial series of articles by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell,2 cumulating in their book
Fairness versus Welfare.3 Kaplow and Shavell have argued that
normative legal theory in general, and theorizing about private law
in particular, should be guided by welfarism—a normative theory
associated with the discipline of economics. In addition, they claim
that considerations of fairness should be entirely excluded from
normative legal theory. In other words, Kaplow and Shavell argue
for a particular form of consequentialism as the exclusive method
for the normative evaluation of private law. In opposition to their
claim, I shall argue that welfarism (as a comprehensive and exclu2
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy
Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, 112 J. Pol. Econ. 281 (2001) [hereinafter
Kaplow & Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any
Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: Reply, 109
J. Pol. Econ. 249 (2004); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict between Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle, 1 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 63 (1999); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle,
Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. Legal Stud. 331 (2003); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 Yale L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of
Fairness]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Reply to Ripstein: Notes on Welfarist versus Deontological Principles, 20 Econ. & Phil. 209 (2004); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, All Individuals May Be Made Worse Off Under Any Nonwelfarist Principle
(John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 350, 2002), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=304385; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Principles of
Fairness versus Human Welfare: On the Evaluation of Legal Policy (John M. Olin
Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 277, 2000), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=224946.
3
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (2002); see also Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961 (2001)
[hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (article)].
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sionary moral doctrine) has no legitimate place in normative legal
theory because it is inconsistent with the requirements of public
reason and hence with the legitimacy of private law. The argument
that I make will also imply that an exclusive emphasis on the deep
premises of deontological moral theory is also inappropriate. Reduced to a slogan, my claim could be put as follows: both fairness
and consequences, but neither welfarism nor deontology.
My discussion of welfarism in general, and Kaplow and Shavell
in particular, will focus both on the general relationship between
welfarism and public reason and on the particular claims that Kaplow and Shavell make on behalf of welfarism. One of these
claims—that any nonwelfarist methodology can result in the counterintuitive conclusion that a possible world that makes everyone
worse off is better than one that makes everyone better off—
provides the occasion for an extended discussion of the conceptual
heart of welfarism as the exclusive method for the evaluation of legal policies.
In the remainder of this Introduction, I introduce the conceptual
vocabulary that grounds the rest of the Essay and, in particular,
five concepts: welfarism, consequentialism, fairness, deontology,
and public reason. The aim is to give a preliminary definition of
these ideas that will both clarify and adumbrate the more detailed
arguments that follow.
Welfarism is the view that policies (or, strictly speaking, the
states of affairs that policies produce) should be assessed solely by
a social-welfare function that considers only information about individual preferences. Welfarism can be combined with another
idea, consequentialism, the view that actions should be evaluated
solely on the basis of their consequences (the states of affairs which
the actions produce). Kaplow and Shavell’s thesis is that assessment or evaluation of legal policies should be based solely and exclusively on the consequences of legal policies for the satisfaction
of preferences from an impartial or anonymous point of view. For
them, fairness and other rival moral values simply have no role to
play in the normative evaluation of the law.
Fairness is the idea that policies (and not, strictly speaking, the
states of affairs that policies produce) can be assessed in part by
the criteria of corrective and distributive justice. In contrast to welfarism, fairness is inconsistent with consequentialism because the
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justice or injustice of a policy is not solely a function of the consequences that the policy produces. The idea of fairness may be
grounded in deontology—an approach (or family of approaches) to
moral philosophy. Deontological theories maintain that the rightness or wrongness of actions is not reducible to the value of the
states of affairs that they produce. Rather, an action may be wrongful because it violates rights, even if the action produces good consequences.
Public reason, for the purposes of this Essay, is the common or
shared reason of citizens in a pluralist and democratic society. An
ideal of public reason provides a normative standard for assessment
of the kinds of reasons offered in public, political, and legal contexts. Here, I shall be dealing with a subset of public reason (legal
reason) and a subset of the ideal of public reason (an ideal of legal
reason), a normative standard for the practice of justification by
lawyers, judges, and other officials.
The significance of the fairness-versus-welfare debate for the
practice of normative legal theory can hardly be overstated. For
example, Kaplow and Shavell claim that there is only one reasonable approach to normative legal scholarship, and that approach is
welfarism. The obvious implication is that other normative theories
should be set aside. Legal scholars working in the traditions of corrective justice, critical legal studies, critical race theory, feminist jurisprudence, neoformalism, liberal political theory, libertarianism,
and virtue jurisprudence are in serious need of reeducation. Even
utilitarians who do not identify utility with preferences are seriously misguided. If Kaplow and Shavell’s arguments are correct,
then most of the legal academy should confess error, repudiate
their prior normative work, and prepare for a brave new world.
But Kaplow and Shavell are not unique in their totalitarian ambitions. There are other legal theories that make similar claims.
Ronald Dworkin, for example, has argued that consequentialism
(or policy, as he puts it) has no place in judicial reasoning.4 Of
course, every legal theory worth its salt claims to be true or correct

4

Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, in Taking Rights Seriously 81, 84 (1977); Ronald
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1060 (1975).
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in some sense,5 but many theories admit of a reasonable pluralism
of theoretical perspectives.6 That is, many normative theories of
law acknowledge that at least some competing theories could be affirmed by reasonable persons; for some normative theories, the
fact of reasonable pluralism is one of the features of the world that
has important normative consequences.7 Many theorists view their
own theory as the best member of the set of reasonable theories
and believe that diverse theoretical perspectives can share common
principles. However, because Kaplow and Shavell’s argument
claims that their opponents are committed to contradictory beliefs,
it implies that competing theories are not only wrong but also unreasonable, irrational, or inconsistent.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I will situate the fairnessversus-welfare debate by placing welfare economics in the context
of moral and political philosophy and contemporary legal theory.
Part II will articulate and argue for an ideal of public legal reason.
Part III will put welfarism at the bar of public legal reason and find
it wanting. The Essay will conclude that arguments of policy and
principle both have roles to play in public legal reason.
Since the argument of this Essay is long and complex, a few additional words of introduction may be of assistance to the reader.
This Essay will advance two central theses. The first thesis, the focus of Part II, is that a particular ideal of “public legal reason” is
supported by considerations of political morality and legal theory.
The second thesis, the focus of Part III, is that the version of welfarism advocated by Kaplow and Shavell does not meet the requirements of public legal reason. In the course of advancing the second
thesis, this Essay will take an in-depth look at Kaplow and Shavell’s claim that any nonwelfarist theory of policy evaluation violates
the requirements of weak Pareto. Given the two theses, this Essay
will then reach its final conclusions. The practice of legal justifica5
This claim may be exaggerated. Some postmodern views of the world may not
claim to be true or correct. Such theories may be illuminating, revealing, or edifying.
See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 11–12 (2d prtg. 1980).
6
The idea of reasonable pluralism is closely related to John Rawls’s views. See
Rawls, supra note 1, at 441. A similar perspective is found in Cass Sunstein’s notion of
an incompletely theorized agreement. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 8 (1996).
7
For example, in justice as fairness, the fact of reasonable pluralism plays a central
role. See Rawls, supra note 1, at 489.

SOLUM_BOOK

2006]

10/22/2006 3:51 PM

Public Legal Reason

1455

tion should limit itself to values that are accessible to reasonable
citizens. This means that law’s deliberations should be shallow, not
deep.
I. SITUATING THE FAIRNESS-VERSUS-WELFARE DEBATE
The fairness-versus-welfare debate will make more sense if
placed in context by (1) considering welfarism in the history of
economic thought in general and welfare economics in particular,
(2) situating welfarism and fairness on the map of moral and political philosophy, and (3) exploring the relationship between fairness
and welfare to the topography of normative legal theory.
A. Welfare Economics
The fairness-versus-welfare debate reflects the importance of the
law and economics movement in the legal academy. Legal economics, like economics generally, has a descriptive (or positive) and a
prescriptive (or normative) branch. Descriptive economics seeks to
predict and explain economic behavior, and descriptive legal economics typically seeks to predict and explain economic behavior as
it is affected by legal rules. Normative economics is concerned with
the evaluation of economic behaviors and government policies,
while normative law and economics is concerned with the evaluation of legal rules. In Fairness versus Welfare, Kaplow and Shavell
practice both descriptive and normative economics, but welfarism
is self-avowedly a normative theory.
There are several plausible formulations of normative economics, but almost all of normative economics begins with the fundamental idea of utility as a conception or measure of the good.
Economists may disagree about the nature of utility, the relationship of utility to social welfare, and the role of welfare in public
policy, but most (if not all) economists would assent to the abstract
proposition that, ceteris paribus, more utility is a good thing.
Beyond such very general agreements, there are a host of disagreements within economic theory. One key divide is between
cardinal and ordinal interpretations of utility. An ordinal utility
function for an individual consists of a rank ordering of possible
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states of affairs (possible worlds) for that individual.8 An ordinal
function indicates that individual i prefers possible world X to possible world Y, but it does not indicate whether X is much better or
only a little better than Y.9 A cardinal utility function yields a realnumber value for each possible world. Assuming that utility functions yield values expressed in utiles (units of utility), then individual i’s utility function might score possible world P at 80 utiles and
possible world Q at 120 utiles. One can represent the utility function U of individual i for P and Q as follows:
i
U (P) = 80 utiles
i
U (Q) = 120 utiles
The distinction between cardinal and ordinal utilities is potentially important for utilitarianism, at least on certain interpretations. As a theory of evaluation, utilitarianism is the view that an
action is the best action if and only if the action maximizes utility
when compared with all possible alternative actions.10 For technical
reasons, utilitarianism requires both cardinality and full interpersonal comparability.11 This point about utilitarianism is closely related to the history of welfare economics,12 the explicitly normative
branch of economic theory.
Both cardinality and interpersonal comparability pose measurement problems for economists. Even in the case of a single individual, it is difficult to measure cardinal utilities reliably. Measure8
For the most part, I shall use the philosophical locution “possible world” rather
than the economists’ phrase “state of affairs” for the remainder of this Essay.
9
Economists sometimes talk about the utility of consumption of goods or services as
opposed to the utility of states of affairs. Talk about the utility of consumption or of
goods is shorthand for talk about states of affairs or possible worlds. When an economist says “Ben would receive a utility of 100 by consuming a widget,” that statement
can be translated into “Ben’s utility index for a possible world in which Ben receives a
widget would be 100 points higher than Ben’s utility index for a possible world that is
identical in all respects except Ben’s consumption of the widget.”
10
See John A. Weymark, A reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen debate on utilitarianism, in Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being 255, 299 (Jon Elster & John E.
Rohmer eds., 1991) (“Utilitarian theories evaluate the relative desirability of social
alternatives in terms of a weighted sum of the utilities obtained by each person in society from the alternatives being considered.”).
11
Id. at 303. The intuitive idea follows from the notion that utilitarianism requires
maximization of utility across persons, “the greatest good for the greatest number.”
Maximization across persons requires interpersonal comparability. Maximization
across persons requires cardinality.
12
See Robin Boadway & Neil Bruce, Welfare Economics 1, 5–6 (1984).
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ments that support interpersonal comparisons are even more difficult to justify, and cardinal interpersonal comparisons seem to require a variety of controversial value judgments. Market prices
cannot serve as a proxy for utility for a variety of reasons, including
wealth effects.13 The challenge for welfare economists is to develop
a methodology that yields robust evaluations but does not require
cardinal interpersonally comparable utilities.
This is the point at which the Pareto principles arrive on the
scene. Suppose that all the information available about individual
utilities is ordinal and not interpersonally comparable. In other
words, each individual can rank order possible worlds, but analysts
or policymakers cannot compare the rank orderings across persons.14 The weak Pareto principle suggests that possible world P is
socially preferable to possible world Q if everyone’s ordinal ranking of P is higher than his ranking of Q. Weak Pareto does not go
very far because such unanimity of preferences among all persons
is rare. The strong Pareto principle suggests that possible world P
is socially preferable to possible world Q if at least one person
ranks P higher than Q and no one ranks P lower than Q. Unlike
weak Pareto, strong Pareto does permit some relatively robust
conclusions.
The so-called new welfare economics was based on the insight
that market transactions without externalities satisfy strong Pareto.
If the only difference between world P and world Q is that in P, individuals i1 and i2 engage in an exchange (money for widgets,
chickens for shoes) where both prefer the result of the exchange,
then the exchange is Pareto efficient—and hence satisfies the
strong Pareto principle. A possible world where no further Paretoefficient moves (or trades) are possible is called Pareto optimal.
The assumption about externalities is, of course, crucial. If there

13
See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness
to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 59, 85–87 (1993).
14
See Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 9 (2d ed. 1963). For
legal applications, see, for example, David Luban, Social Choice Theory as Jurisprudence, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 521 (1996); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Lost in
Translation: Social Choice Theory Is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent, 14 J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 585 (2005); William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective
Choice: Arrow’s Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 Duke L.J. 948.
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are negative externalities of any sort, then the trade is not Pareto
efficient.15
Strong Pareto plus ordinal utility information allows some possible worlds to be ranked on the basis of everyone’s preferences. A
method for transforming individual utility information into such a
social ranking is called a social-utility function. Kenneth Arrow’s
impossibility theorem demonstrates that it is impossible to construct a social-utility function that can transform individual ordinal
rankings into a social ranking in cases not covered by strong Pareto
if certain plausible assumptions are made.16 Arrow’s theorem has
spurred two lines of development in welfare economics. One line
of development relaxes various assumptions that Arrow made, for
example, Arrow’s assumption that the social ranking must be transitive (if X is preferred to Y, and Y is preferred to Z, then X must
be preferred to Z). The other line of development considers the
possibility of allowing information other than individual, noncomparable ordinal utilities.
Suppose that full interpersonal comparability and cardinal utility
information are allowed. This is sufficient to support what are
called Bergson-Samuelson utility functions,17 which have the form
1

2

N

W(x) = F(U (x), U (x), . . . U (x))
where W(x) represents a real number social utility value for some
possible world X; F is some increasing function that yields a real
1
number; U (x) is a cardinal, interpersonally comparable utility
value yielded by some procedure for individual 1 for possible world
X; and N is the total number of individuals.18

15

This problem can be ameliorated, however, by considering the possibility of a side
payment that would compensate the party injured by the externality. Transaction
costs may prevent such side payments; the costs of compensating the injured property
may consume more than the surplus value created by transaction. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency addresses this problem by making an additional assumption about what is socially preferable. One could postulate that state X is socially preferable to state Y if
zero-transaction-cost side payments were made from those who prefer X to Y to those
who prefer Y to X, which would make the recipients indifferent between the states.
16
See Arrow, supra note 14; see also Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson,
Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy 167–69 (1996).
17
Boadway & Bruce, supra note 12, at 17.
18
Id. at 139.
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There are a variety of different possible functions that can be
substituted for F. For example, one could substitute summation (∑)
for F and simply add the individual utility values. This is sometimes
called a Benthamite or classical utilitarian social-welfare function
and is famously associated with Jeremy Bentham. The classical
utilitarian social-welfare function can be represented as follows:
H

W = ∑ uh
h =1

In the alternative, one could substitute the product function (∏)
and multiply individual utilities. This is sometimes called a Bernoulli-Nash social-welfare function, which can be represented as
follows:
H

W = ∏ uh
h =1

The Bernoulli-Nash social-welfare function has an important
technical advantage over the classical utilitarian function because
the former requires only information about the relative strength of
individual preferences, whereas the latter requires information on
some absolute scale. Bernoulli-Nash differs from the classical utility function in another important respect—it strongly favors equality (minimization of deviation) among individual utility values.
There are a variety of other possible social-welfare functions, some
of which will be discussed in greater detail below.
Welfarism is an important component of Kaplow and Shavell’s
theory. Welfarism is lucidly defined by Professor Amartya Sen,
who states:
“[W]elfarism[]” . . . insists that states of affairs must be judged
exclusively by the utility information (such as happiness or desire
fulfillment) related to the respective states—no matter what the
other features of the consequent state of affairs may be, such as
the performance of particular acts (however nasty), or the viola19
tion of other people’s liberties (however personal).

19

Amartya Sen, Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason, 97 J. Phil. 477,
478–79 (2000); see also Boadway & Bruce, supra note 12, at 8.
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Sen’s definition gives us a good sense of the general concept of
welfare, but welfarism as advocated by Kaplow and Shavell represents a very particular approach to welfare economics. Their version of welfarism departs from the main line of development of the
new welfare economics because they assume that cardinal and
interpersonally comparable utility information is available. That is,
Kaplow and Shavell’s version of welfarism is committed to a Bergson-Samuelson social-welfare function. On the other hand, welfarism is not equivalent to a particular form of that function. In particular, welfarism is not committed to classical utilitarianism,
although most welfarists (including Kaplow and Shavell) espouse
the idea that a social-welfare function must be an increasing function of individual utilities.
B. Moral and Political Philosophy
This Section takes a step back and approaches the fairnessversus-welfare debate from another angle—by situating the debate
within the discourse of moral and political philosophy. Normative
economics is related to moral and political philosophy in a variety
of ways. An economist might take the position that individual persons should act so as to maximize their expected utilities. Normative rational-choice theory would seem to be a moral or ethical theory, one that philosophers might see as a species of ethical egoism.
A welfare economist might advocate a classical utilitarian socialwelfare function. To the moral and political philosopher, this
would appear to be a form of classical utilitarianism. Thus, viewed
from one angle, normative economics simply is applied moral and
political philosophy, and theories of welfare are moral and political
theories.
There is, however, another way of viewing the relationship between normative economics and moral philosophy. Economists see
themselves as social scientists. Given a crude picture of the factvalue distinction, normative economics might be seen as unscientific. Even weak Pareto involves a value judgment, and economists
may believe that this value judgment can neither be proved nor
disproved. Economists may see such value judgments as subjective
rather than objective. This way of looking at normative judgments
may stem from a philosophical theory such as noncognitivist
metaethics, the view that moral propositions are neither true nor
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false. Crudely put, noncognitivists might believe that moral judgments are simply expressions of approval and disapproval. The reductio ad absurdum of noncognitivism is the famous boo-hooray
theory, which reduces the meaning of “X is good” to “hooray X”
and “X is bad” to “boo X.”20 Although noncognitivism is itself
highly controversial in moral philosophy, it seems less controversial
(and perhaps even unquestioned or unexamined) in economics.
Whatever the source of economists’ aversion to value judgments,
much of the history of welfare economics can be seen as involving
value parsimony, or efforts to get the maximum prescriptive content from the “weakest” (meaning “least controversial”) normative
assumptions. Hence, the new welfare economists tried to operate
on the basis of one normative assumption, strong Pareto. From
their point of view, strong Pareto appears to be uncontroversial.
Even if it cannot be proven, some economists may believe that it is
so intuitively plausible and widely shared that it is an appropriate
point of departure.
Moral and political philosophy does not share the value parsimony of normative economics. In particular, noncognitivism is
highly controversial within the philosophical discipline of metaethics. Although there may have been a time when noncognitivist
metaethical theories were dominant, that time has now passed. Although it might be controversial to assert that the cognitivist approaches now dominate, it is surely not controversial to assert that
many philosophers now believe that moral propositions are objective, bear truth values, and can be proven or disproven (or can be
shown to be better or worse). In addition, as noted below, weak
Pareto itself is not an uncontroversial normative assumption from
the point of view of moral philosophy.
From the standpoint of moral and political philosophy, welfarism is just one of a whole family of consequentialist moral theories. Because of the important historical role that classical utilitarianism has played in moral philosophy, some philosophers and legal
theorists may assume that welfarism is merely a version of act-

20
See Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic 102–20 (1952); see also Lawrence
Solum,
Legal
Theory
Lexicon
041:
Metaethics
(June
20,
2004),
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/06/legal_theory_le.html.
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utilitarianism,21 but this is not actually the case for multiple reasons.
First, welfarism is only a theory about the evaluation of possible
worlds; it is not directly a theory about the evaluation of actions.
Act-utilitarianism is, however, a theory about the rightness and
wrongness of actions. Second, welfarism is only committed to the
idea that social welfare is an increasing function of individual utilities, whereas act-utilitarianism is usually thought to be committed
to either summation or average (mean) as the relevant function. I
could go on, but the point is clear—welfarism should not be conflated with act-utilitarianism.
Another important philosophical question concerns the nature
of utility. Welfarism is committed to a view that is close to what
moral philosophers might call the preference-satisfaction conception of utility, but there are other conceptions as well. Bentham
had a hedonistic conception of utility—utility consists of pleasures
and the absence of pain. One might also have a eudaimonistic conception of utility; that is, utility might consist of happiness, understood as a quality that is not reducible to any subjective state, such
as pleasure, but is instead an objective condition of human life,
such as flourishing.
Contemporary moral philosophy is not limited to consequentialism. What I am about to say is controversial, but I think it is accurate. Within contemporary moral philosophy, utilitarianism is generally thought to have severe problems. To my knowledge,
welfarism in the form that has entered contemporary debates
about normative legal theory has no champion in moral philosophy, although it is surely possible that someone does hold a position that is close to welfarism. There are consequentialists in contemporary moral philosophy and there are utilitarians of various
forms, but these theories are controversial and contested.
What are the alternatives to consequentialism in contemporary
moral philosophy? Answering that question in a single paragraph
with a simple system of classification is bound to be misleading, but
21

Act-utilitarianism is the theory that holds that an action is right if and only if the
action produces the best consequences (the most utility) as compared to any other
alternative action that could be performed. See David Braybrooke, Utilitarianism:
Restoration; Repairs; Renovations 11 (2004); see also Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory
Lexicon 008: Utilitarianism (Nov. 2, 2003), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_
lexicon/2003/11/legal_theory_le_4.html.
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there is no other way to proceed. One way of dividing the pie is to
classify moral theories as being (1) consequentialist, (2) deontological, or (3) aretaic. Deontological moral theories, as noted
above, hold that the rightness or wrongness of actions is not exclusively a function of the consequences they produce but also results
from their fairness or unfairness. Some deontological theories exclude consequentialist reasons altogether; on some interpretations,
Kant’s theory does this. Other deontological moral theories allow
for the consideration of consequences in some circumstances but
maintain that considerations of fairness trump good consequences
in other circumstances.
In addition to consequentialist and deontological views, some
moral theories are aretaic. The word “aretaic” comes from the
Greek word “arete,” which can be translated as virtue or excellence. Aristotle’s moral views are sometimes classified as aretaic, as
are the contemporary theories that are called “virtue ethics.” Virtue-centered theories typically deny that there is a master algorithm or decision procedure for ethics. Instead, they focus on character—on what it means to be an excellent or virtuous person.
Typically, an aretaic moral theory will include an account of the
human excellences or virtues.22
So far, I have been dealing with moral philosophy, but the relevant landscape includes political philosophy as well. I begin by discussing the relationship between moral and political philosophy.
One approach to that relationship would emphasize dependence
and reduction. That is, one might think that political philosophy
must be grounded on and ultimately reducible to moral philosophy. On this view of the relationship, political theories are ultimately consequentialist, deontological, or aretaic. This does not
mean that political philosophies would not have distinctive content.
After all, there are many different approaches to the organization
of society that could be given consequentialist foundations. One
can imagine consequentialist foundations for either deliberative
democracy or for a minimalist night-watchman state. The other
approach to the relationship between political and moral philoso-

22
See generally Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics 25–42 (1999); Rosalind
Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta
ed., 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/.
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phy would emphasize the independence of political philosophy
from moral theory. This idea is thematized in the later work of
John Rawls, especially Political Liberalism23 and associated essays.
There are a variety of positions in contemporary normative political theory, including Rawls’s theory, justice as fairness, libertarian
theories, egalitarian theories, democratic theories, and civic republican theories.
C. The State of the Normative Legal Theory
Legal theory is hardly a monolith, but most of it either describes
the law, evaluates the law, or does both. Normative legal theory, in
turn, comes in a variety of flavors. Legal formalism is strongly associated with doctrinal scholarship, which evaluates particular doctrines or decisions based on a criterion of coherence with the legal
topography. For example, a judicial decision might be criticized on
the ground that it is inconsistent with prior decisions or the decisions of a court that ranks higher in the hierarchy of authority. In
addition to legal formalism, there are a variety of normative theories that look outside the law for normative guidance. Attempting
to categorize normative legal theories and then to generalize about
them is fraught with peril, but with this caveat in mind, the following categories are useful as a heuristic:
(1) Critical theories of law, including feminist jurisprudence,
critical race theory, and critical legal studies, expose the indeterminacies and bias of other approaches but frequently refrain
from making explicit normative recommendations;
(2) Liberal legal theories, including law as integrity, legal versions of justice as fairness, and libertarian approaches to law,
emphasize considerations of fairness and the importance of
rights;
(3) Normative law and economics emphasizes the value of efficiency and may be grounded in utilitarianism or pragmatism;

23

Rawls, supra note 1.
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(4) Practical-reason and virtue-jurisprudence approaches emphasize the role of practical judgment in legal decisionmaking and
may consider the role of law in shaping character;
(5) Republican, deliberative-democracy, and discourse approaches emphasize the value of reaching political decisions
through just processes; and
(6) Pragmatism or legal pragmatism eschews unifying normative
theories and emphasizes practical judgments about particular
cases.

One can slice and dice the normative legal theory pie in various
ways. For example, critical theorists want to emphasize the affinities of liberalism with law and economics. For the purposes of this
Essay, the point of these rough-and-ready classifications is simply
to situate welfarism in general, and Kaplow and Shavell’s version
in particular, in the context of the plurality of approaches to normative legal theory.
II. PUBLIC LEGAL REASON
The central claim of this Essay is two-sided. On its face, the central claim is positive and general: normative legal theory should
employ the resources of “public legal reason,” understood as legal
reasons that are accessible by all reasonable citizens. The flip side
of that claim is negative and more specific: Kaplow and Shavell are
wrong, and welfarism should not be the exclusive normative approach to the evaluation of legal policies. Indeed, Kaplow and
Shavell’s version of welfarism—to the extent that it claims exclusivity—does not provide judges or legal scholars with an appropriate
basis for reasoning.
A. The Idea of Public Reason
“Public reason” is the common reason of a political society; it is
the shared capacity of citizens to engage in political deliberation.
An ideal of public reason provides a systematic answer to the following question: what limits does political morality impose on public political debate and discussion by the citizens of a modern pluralist democracy? This question has given rise to a substantial
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debate, one that primarily has played out among political philosophers, legal theorists,24 and theologians. For example, some have
argued that reliance on religious reasons should be restricted in
public debate and deliberation about public policy.25 Still others
contend that in public debate, an ideal of political morality should
mirror the freedom of expression: all viewpoints should contend in
a marketplace of ideas. Because legal institutions such as courts
and legislatures make use of public reason, it is not surprising that
the idea of public reason has stirred much interest among philosophers of law and legal theorists.
Contemporary debates about public reason have tended to focus
on the content of the principle (or set of principles) that should
serve as an ideal of public reason. This disagreement occurs because one can conceive of different principles by which an ideal can
express the requirement that reason be public. Laying out these
principles provides a structure for analyzing the public-reason debate. The structure of the debate can be illuminated by considering
three alternative principles that can be used to give content to an
ideal of public reason: (1) a principle of laissez-faire, (2) a principle
of exclusion, and (3) a principle of inclusion.
Each of the three principles needs brief explication. First, a principle of laissez-faire interprets the idea of public reason as reason
that is free of constraint, with the corollary that all reasons are public reasons. Second, a principle of exclusion rules out the use of at
least some sorts of nonpublic reasons in at least some situations.
For example, an ideal of public reason that excluded all nonpublic
reasons from all political discourse would employ a simple principle of exclusion. Third, a principle of inclusion requires the use of
at least some sorts of public reasons in at least some situations. For
example, an ideal of public reason that required participants in
24

See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons 39–50 (1995).
See, e.g., Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason 169–80 (2000).
For other recent discussion of this question, see Rick Garnett, More on Justice Thomas, Public Reason, and Natural Law (Dec. 16, 2004), http://www.mirrorof
justice.com/mirrorofjustice/2004/12/more_on_justice.html; Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Law, Public Reason, and the Constitution (Dec. 15, 2004),
http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/2004_12_01_lsolum_archive.html#1103128654100
52268; Lawrence B. Solum, Steve Smith Has Questions About Justice Thomas &
Natural Law with an Updated Post Script (Dec. 16, 2004), http://lsolum.
blogspot.com/archives/2004_12_01_lsolum_archive.html#110321991307216361.
25
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public political debates to offer a sincerely held public reason for
each position advanced would deploy a principle of inclusion.
The three basic principles can be combined in various ways to
produce a complex ideal of public reason. A principle of exclusion
might apply to public officials, but a principle of laissez-faire might
apply to ordinary citizens. Different principles might apply to public debate over the constitutional essentials than to ordinary legislation, adjudication, or executive action. One set of principles might
apply to public justifications and a different set to private deliberations.
Sometimes it seems that the public-reason debate is a contest between a simple principle of laissez-faire, advocated by those whose
aim is to formulate an ideal of public reason that makes room for
deep moral or religious justifications for public policy, and a simple
principle of exclusion, advocated by those who wish to keep religion or morality out of politics. As explained below, this view of the
debate is far too simple. Positions that at first blush appear to be
simple principles of laissez-faire turn out to be complex principles
with elements of both laissez-faire and exclusion. Positions that
have been interpreted as rigorous principles of exclusion turn out
to be more accurately characterized as principles of inclusion.
B. Rawlsian Public Reason
Although the idea of public reason can be found26 in Hobbes,27
Rousseau,28 and Kant,29 it was John Rawls who brought this idea
into play in contemporary political philosophy. In sum, Rawls’s
idea of public reason is marked by three features. First, Rawls understands public reason as the common reason of a political society. A society’s reason is its “way of formulating its plans, of putting its ends in an order of priority and of making its decisions
accordingly.”30 Public reason contrasts with the “nonpublic reasons
26

See Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 San Diego L.
Rev. 729, 754–62 (1993).
27
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 306 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1660).
28
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy, in Basic Political Writings 111, 113 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., 1987).
29
Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in Political Writings 54, 55 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d enlarged ed. 1991).
30
Rawls, supra note 1, at 212.
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of churches and universities and of many other associations in civil
society.”31 Both public and nonpublic reason share features that are
essential to reason itself, such as simple rules of inference and evidence.32 Public reasons, however, are limited to premises and
modes of reasoning that are accessible to the public at large. Rawls
argues that these include “presently accepted general beliefs and
forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and
conclusions of science when these are not controversial.”33 By contrast, the nonpublic reason of a church might include premises
about the authority of sacred texts and modes of reasoning that
appeal to the interpretive authority of particular persons. Nonpublic reasons are not, however, limited to religious reasons. The deep
and controversial premises of any comprehensive moral conception, such as utilitarianism or Kantian deontological ethics, are also
nonpublic reasons.
Second, Rawls formulates a particular ideal of public reason—a
standard for judging the appropriateness of the reasoning of citizens and officials. Rawls’s discussion is limited to “the constitutional essentials”34 and “questions of basic justice.”35 Thus, the
scope of the freedom of speech and qualifications for the franchise
would be subject to the Rawlsian ideal, but he does not resolve the
question whether it would also apply to the details of tax legislation
and the regulation of pollution control.36
Third, Rawls’s ideal of public reason applies to citizens and public officials when they engage in political advocacy in a public forum; it also governs the decisions that officials make and the votes
that citizens cast in elections. The ideal does not apply to personal
31

Id. at 213.
Id. at 220.
33
Id. at 224.
34
The constitutional essentials are simply the basic provisions of the constitution:
the structural provisions that determine legislative, executive, and judicial power and
the rights-conferring provisions that ensure basic constitutional rights such as the right
to vote, liberty of conscience, freedoms of speech and religion, and the right to due
process. See id. at 227.
35
Questions of basic justice include the scope of essential liberties, such as freedom
of conscience and expression, as well as core commitments to fairness in the distribution of wealth, income, and other primary goods. Id. at 214, 227–30.
36
Rawls notes that a full account of public reason would need to offer an account of
these subjects and how they differ from the constitutional essentials and questions of
basic justice. See id. at 214–15.
32
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reflection and deliberation about political questions;37 by implication, it could not apply to such reflection or deliberation about
questions that are not political in nature.
Rawls’s case for an ideal of public reason rests on a factual
premise. Rawls argues that given free institutions, one cannot expect agreement on fundamental questions of morality and religion.
Moreover, the pluralism that characterizes modern democratic societies is not a transitory phenomenon; since the Wars of Religion,
it has been apparent that agreement on a single comprehensive
moral or religious conception of the good cannot be reached without unacceptable use of coercive state power. Given this fact,
which can be called the fact of pluralism, Rawls argues that one
should adhere to what he calls the liberal principle of legitimacy.
That principle states: “Our exercise of political power is proper and
hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to
them as reasonable and rational.”38 It is because of this principle
that “the ideal of citizenship imposes . . . the duty of civility—to be
able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how
the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason.”39 The duty of civility implies that the fundamental content of Rawls’s ideal of public
reason is a principle of inclusion: civility requires that political justification include public reasons, because public reasons can be accepted by our fellow citizens as reasonable and rational.
C. Is the Exclusion of Deep Premises Justified?
The full debate over the best ideal of public reason for a modern
democratic society must include a comparison of various principles
of laissez-faire, inclusion, and exclusion in a variety of contexts.40
An illustration of that debate is the controversy over the question
whether an ideal of public reason should incorporate any principle
of exclusion.
37

Id. at 215.
Id. at 217.
39
Id.
40
See Solum, supra note 26, at 741–51.
38

SOLUM_BOOK

1470

10/22/2006 3:51 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 92:1449

A relatively easy case is posed by the question of whether citizens should refrain from the giving of religious reasons in public
political debate. Although some may disagree, there is a strong
case against this exclusion on the grounds that it is unfair to religious believers. Why should religious believers accept as legitimate
an ideal of public reason that allows adherents of secular moral
views to advance their comprehensive moral doctrines, even when
they are not part of the public political culture, but prohibits believers from doing so? Rawls’s wide ideal of public reason does not
suffer from this sort of unfairness because it treats all comprehensive doctrines, whether religious or secular, equally: utilitarianism,
Kantianism, and Catholicism stand on the same footing because
each articulates deep and comprehensive views about the nature of
the good.
In the context of the fairness-versus-welfare debate, the same
charge of unfairness that is made by religious believers might be
made by welfarists or deontologists. They might argue that the exclusion of the deep premises of their theories is unfair. The answer
that could be given to them is the same as the answer that could be
given to believers. An ideal of public reason treats the deep premises of all comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines
equally.
Consider another argument against principles of exclusion, advanced by Jeremy Waldron:
What [Rawls’s] conception seems to rule out is the novel or disconcerting move in political argumentation: the premise that no
one has ever thought of before, but which, once stated, sounds
plausible or interesting. Rawls’ conception seems to assume an
inherent limit in the human capacity for imagination and creativity in politics, implying as it does that something counts as a legitimate move in public reasoning only to the extent that it
41
latches onto existing premises that everybody already shares.

Waldron’s claim is too strong. If public reason required universal
agreement on premises, then public political debate would be impossible.42 Even an ideal of public reason that excluded all nonpub41
Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 San Diego L.
Rev. 817, 838 (1993).
42
See Solum, supra note 26, at 743.
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lic reasons would allow for premises that are not already shared.
To take an obvious example, this exclusionary principle would allow factual premises that are accessible to common science or ordinary science, even though these are not premises that everybody
already shares. Moreover, no violation of this principle of exclusion
would occur if a citizen used shared political values and factual arguments supported by common sense or ordinary science to argue
for a new principle of political morality. Something similar has occurred over the course of the last century or so with respect to the
right to privacy, a principle of political morality that is, at least in
some sense, new. Thus, Waldron’s argument applies only to a very
special category of novel political arguments—those that cannot
themselves be supported by considerations of public reason.
The force of Waldron’s point is further blunted by the fact that
the wide ideal of public reason only excludes nonpublic reasons in
those cases in which the proviso—that in due course participants in
public political debate support the political measures they propose
in terms of the principles and values of a public political conception
of justice—is not met. One can imagine that novel political arguments would be introduced in cases in which the proviso was satisfied and that over time these novel arguments would become part
of the public political culture. As a result, the novel arguments
eventually would become public reasons.
Of course, there may remain a category of cases in which a novel
political argument that could not itself be supported by public reasons would violate the public-reason-in-due-course proviso because the novel argument is only relevant in contexts in which the
proviso could not be met. Even in these cases, the nonpublic reason could be introduced outside of public political debate, in the
background culture. Thus, the novel argument might first be introduced in academic discourse or even in an opinion piece in a newspaper or journal of public circulation, so long as the author did not
advance the argument as an already sufficient reason for political
action. Again, one can imagine a process by which such novel arguments came to be viewed as public reasons over time.
Yet there may still be a category of cases in which a political
question arises, and time does not permit gradual public acceptance of a novel political argument that is not itself supported by
public reasons and that cannot be supplemented by a public reason
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in due course. Even in this case, there seems to be no reason for
the wide ideal of public reason to exclude the novel argument if its
proponent believes it will be accepted by her fellow citizens as reasonable. The liberal principle of legitimacy states that the exercise
of political power is justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with constitutional essentials that all citizens may reasonably
be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable
to them as reasonable and rational. Although Rawls may occasionally have stated his ideal of public reason in terms of preexisting
agreement among citizens about the premises of political argument, there is nothing in his underlying arguments that requires
this restriction.
In sum, the Rawlsian ideal of public reason does not exclude
novel arguments simply because they are novel. This is true for
three reasons: first, novel reasons are public if they can be supported by public reasons; second, novel reasons may be introduced
in the background culture and may become public reasons over
time if they become accessible to the public at large; and third, any
reason counts as public if it is accessible to reasonable citizens. Of
course, some novel reasons would not count as public for the purposes of Rawls’s ideal of public reason—any reason that is situated
within a comprehensive moral or political doctrine in a way that
makes it inaccessible to reasonable persons from outside the doctrine would fall into this category. For example, the reasons provided by a new prophetic religion—to the extent that their authority relied on the special religious status of the prophet—would be
novel and would not be public.
D. From Public Reason to Public Legal Reason
Up to this point, I have focused on the role of public reason in
public political debate. In that context, the best ideal of public reason is inclusive—it allows citizens to advance deep reasons drawn
from their comprehensive moral and religious doctrines so long as
public reasons are advanced in due course. At this stage, I want to
narrow the focus of the inquiry. What are the implications of the
idea of public reason for legal reason? The answer to this question
will provide the materials for what I call an ideal of public legal reason—the normative principles that should govern public reasoning
about the law in a pluralist democracy. Although the discussion
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that follows is broadly consistent with a Rawlsian approach to public reason, the ideal of public legal reason advanced here speaks to
a variety of issues never addressed by Rawls himself.
The ideal of public legal reason that I advocate is an exclusive
ideal. That is, I argue that legal officials should offer only public
reasons for their official actions in official contexts. This ideal of
legal reason is narrower than Rawls’s ideal of public reason, although I argue that it is compatible with Rawls’s view.
1. Public Legal Reason and the Legal Practice
How does the idea of public reason translate into the context of
legal practice? What constraints, if any, does the best ideal of public reason impose on lawyers who make legal arguments and judges
who provide reasons for their decisions in their formal written
opinions? These questions should be distinguished from another
set of questions—what constraints does public reason impose on
the practice of legal scholarship?
I begin by examining the implications of public legal reason for
judicial reasoning.43 This is the appropriate starting point because
judging is the place where the tread of legal reason meets the road
of practical decisionmaking. Lawyers and legal scholars provide input, but judges decide cases. By focusing on judging, I do not mean
to diminish the importance of the role of public reason in legislative and executive deliberation and debate. After discussing judging and lawyers, I return to the legislative context and briefly compare and contrast an ideal of public legal reason to the ideal that
applies to legislators and other participants in the legislative process.
What about public legal reason for judges and judging? Rawls
argued that the Supreme Court serves as an exemplar of public
reason: “The court’s role is . . . to give due and continuing effect to
public reason by serving as its institutional exemplar. This means,
first, that public reason is the sole reason the court exercises.”44 Although Rawls himself did not fully develop an ideal of public legal
reason, it is clear that a Rawlsian ideal of public reason has important implications for fundamental debates in legal theory.
43
44

See William Powers, Jr., Judging Judging, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 857, 863–65 (1994).
Rawls, supra note 1, at 235 (footnote omitted).
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One might pose the question as follows: does the best ideal of
public legal reason permit judges to invoke the deep premises of
comprehensive moral or religious doctrines in their opinions or deliberations? One can imagine a variety of answers to this question.
For example, a principle of laissez-faire would offer an unqualified
affirmative answer, whereas a strong principle of exclusion would
offer an unqualified negative response. The intermediate positions
could include rules of inclusion or a mixture of laissez-faire and exclusion, depending on the particular context.
Before I proceed any further, I need to pause and consider the
possibility that the content of the best ideal of public legal reason is
fixed by some form of legal formalism—the normative legal theory
that holds that the content of judicial reasoning should be limited
to reasons provided by authoritative legal sources, and that legal
reason should be narrowly conceived as the derivation of rules
from precedent, the interpretation of legal texts, and the application of legal rules to particular facts. Legal formalism can be redescribed as an ideal of public legal reason that excludes direct reliance on reasons of morality, religion, or political theory—whether
shallow or deep.45 For the purposes of this Essay, I want to put this
possibility to the side. That is, I want to assume that legal reasons
may include direct reliance on values derived from outside the law
itself. One way of framing this assumption would use Dworkin’s
theory as an illustration. Assume with Dworkin that judges should
resolve ambiguities, conflicts, and vagueness in the legal rules by
constructing theories that fit and justify the authoritative legal materials. Legal formalists might assume that what Dworkin calls the
“criterion of fit” can do all the work: in other words, formalists believe that we do not need to resort to moral or political philosophy
to resolve hard cases. For the sake of argument, let us assume that
the legal formalists are wrong. That is, our assumption will be that
judges must resort to what Dworkin calls the criterion of justification. The question then becomes, what kinds of justifications are
allowed by the ideal of public legal reason? Dworkin’s own theory
answers this question by going deep—Dworkin’s imaginary judge

45
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare
Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, U. Pa. J. Const.
L. (forthcoming Oct. 2006).
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Hercules sees no limit to the conceptual ascent that may be required to resolve a hard case. But I question that assumption. In
Dworkinian terms, I ask the question whether Hercules ought to
limit himself to public reasons when he devises the theory that best
fits and justifies that law.
I can frame the discussion of this question by testing the proposition that the best ideal of public legal reason would allow judges to
rely on nonpublic reasons drawn from the deep premises of comprehensive religious and moral doctrines. Imagine a possible world
that is adjacent to the actual world, with the following difference:
judges accept a principle of laissez-faire as the governing principle
of public legal reason. That is, judges believe that they are normatively justified in relying on the deep premises of comprehensive
moral or religious doctrines when they deliberate and when they
write opinions. To make the test vivid, assume further that judges
routinely disclose their actual reasoning in full. That is, assume that
they do not suppress the deep reasons that ground their opinions
because it would be more convenient or practical to write shorter
opinions that reflect only the surface or shallow reasons upon
which they rely. Moreover, assume that judges would not dissemble or conceal their true beliefs in order to avoid political backlash.
Because this possible world is adjacent to our own, the judges of
this world reflect the moral and religious pluralism that prevails in
the actual world. Some judges are theists; others are nonbelievers.
Some judges are consequentialists; others are deontologists.
What would the world of laissez-faire public legal reason be
like? It would be a world in which judges would not infrequently
advert to their deepest beliefs about morality or religion as reasons
for their legal decisions. For example, in cases involving the margins of life and personhood—paradigmatically, abortion and
euthanasia—judges might rely on deep premises about the moral
status of persons. One judge might disclose that she relied on comprehensive religious doctrine, which affords the unborn full status
as moral persons on the basis of a religious belief that the unborn
are ensouled at the moment of conception. Another judge might
answer that argument by contending that all religious reasons are
based on the false premise that God exists, and that moral personhood depends on the capacity for reason, which does not exist until
long after birth. To take a less charged case, imagine a tort case in
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which one judge discloses that his decision is based on welfarism
and that he disregarded any claims of fairness on the ground that,
in the end, only consequences for future possible worlds are of
moral significance. Another judge hearing the same case contends
that the consideration of consequences is itself deeply immoral and
that the case can only be decided on the basis of ex post reasoning
about the rights and obligations of the parties.
Is the possible world governed by a laissez-faire principle of public legal reason attractive? There are at least two reasons to answer
that question in the negative. The first reason focuses on the value
of stability and the potential for deep disagreement to undermine
the rule of law. The second reason focuses on the value of legitimacy and the difficulties of submission to legal authority with laissez-faire legal reasons.
Consider first the problem of stability. The actual world is characterized by the fact of pluralism, which means that there is no realistic possibility that a principle of laissez-faire public legal reason
would result in a uniformity of opinion about the deep premises of
theology or moral philosophy. Whatever the capacities of the doctrine of stare decisis are for producing consensus, those capacities
do not extend to agreement over deep matters. Precedent is simply
the wrong sort of reason for belief about the ultimate nature of
morality or the existence of God. To the extent that deep premises
drive the practice of judging, the deep foundations of the law will
be inherently unstable—subject to tectonic shifts with the composition of various tribunals. The precise effects of these architectonic
shifts will be difficult to predict in advance. There is no guarantee
that they will produce rapid and destabilizing changes in the law,
but there is no guarantee that they will not. Moreover, one of the
things that people want from the law is a stable foundation. The
value of a stable foundation for the law is reflected in the great
value placed on the rule of law and the associated values of predictability, stability, and certainty.
Consider second the problem of legitimacy. In the possible world
governed by the laissez-faire ideal of public legal reason, it will inevitably be the case that many or most citizens will reject the particular comprehensive religious or moral doctrine that provides the
crucial deep premises for some decisions. That is, many or most
citizens will not believe that these decisions rest on reasonable
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grounds. Of course, it will inevitably be the case that the law may
rest on premises about facts or values that are not universally acceptable. But the problem posed by direct reliance on deep premises of particular moral or political doctrines is much more substantial than this. It is one thing to be asked to cooperate on the basis
of reasons that are justified by premises one can regard as reasonable but in error. It is quite another to be asked to cooperate on
the basis of reasons that one cannot regard as reasonable.
For example, it is one thing to be asked to accept an authoritative decision based on contestable evidence that dioxin causes cancer. It is quite another to be asked to accept that God’s plan requires that women be subservient—or, for that matter, for a
believer to be asked to accept a decision based on the premise that
God does not exist. It is one thing to be asked to accept an authoritative decision that global warming poses a serious danger. It is
quite another to be asked to accept an authoritative decision premised on the moral principle that only consequences count—or, for
that matter, for a utilitarian to be asked to accept a decision based
on the moral premise that only rights count. Reasonable citizens
are under no obligation to regard themselves as legitimately bound
by the authority of decisions that rest on deep premises that they
cannot accept as reasonable. Given the fact of pluralism, many or
most citizens will regard any legal decision that rests on deep and
controversial premises of religious or moral doctrines as illegitimate in the sense that it lacks reasonable justification.
Legitimacy is to the authority of law as water is to fish and air is
to mammals. When law claims authority, it asks for compliance—
that those to whom the law is addressed will accept the law as providing a good reason for action. Authority can be legitimate or illegitimate. Illegitimate authority must provide prudential reasons for
action—incentives for obedience or punishment for disobedience.
A regime of illegitimate authority can be oppressive, ineffectual, or
both. It can be oppressive because the reliable imposition of sanctions without voluntary cooperation requires legal institutions that
provide pervasive monitoring and frequent punishment, and it can
be ineffectual because rates of coerced compliance are likely to be
lower than rates of voluntary cooperation with legitimate authority. Moreover, the evil of illegitimacy is not limited to the realm of
the practical. Legitimacy reconciles citizens to the binding force of
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law; illegitimacy undermines the basis for reconciliation and hence
the moral worth of citizenship.
Judging provides an illustrative context for the implications of an
ideal of public legal reason for legal practice, but there are other
important contexts, including legal advocacy and legislation. There
is one sense in which the ideal of public legal reason that applies to
judges would apply to lawyers: if a lawyer makes an argument
upon which a judge may not rely, the argument will either be futile
or give rise to a wrongful use of nonpublic reason. However, there
are circumstances in which lawyers may be obligated to make arguments outside the bounds of public legal reason. One such circumstance is the adequate representation of clients who disagree
with the ideal of public legal reason. As a matter of procedural
fairness, the lawyer may have an obligation to represent the dissenting view to the court, even without expecting that the court will
act on the nonpublic reasons that are presented.46 A full discussion
of the similarities and differences between public reason for courts
and legislatures would take us too far afield, but it may be reasonable to allow legislators greater freedom to include nonpublic reasons, even when they discuss or deliberate about legislation in formal contexts such as the floor of Congress.47
46

Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 281 (2004) (“A
citizen who could be finally bound may wish to raise points that either cannot, or
likely will not, have any effect on the outcome of the proceeding. An important example of this involves what we might call ‘principled dissent from legal norms.’ Even
if I have no viable legal argument against a legal norm that binds me, I may have an
interest in making (or even attempting to make) arguments that the norm is illegitimate.”).
47
A full account of the ideal of public reason appropriate to the legislative process
goes beyond the scope of this Essay, but the following observations may be helpful.
Legislative reasons are provided in many different contexts. The most formal and
public of these include official documents such as the preambles of statutes, committee reports, and the like. In those contexts, reasons are offered on behalf of the public
and are addressed, in part, to legal officials who may interpret the legislation. In these
official contexts, the standard for legislative public reason may be identical to the
standard for adjudicative public reason. At the other end of the spectrum, legislators
may provide their reasons for supporting or opposing legislation in informal contexts,
including statements to the media or speeches to constituents. In these informal contexts, an inclusive ideal of public reason—like the Rawlsian ideal outlined above—
seems appropriate. An intermediate case is posed by statements on the floor of a legislative assembly, which are made on behalf of individual legislators, but are also part
of the official legislative history. A reasonable case might be made for either an inclusive or exclusive ideal in this intermediate context.
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2. The Implications of Public Legal Reason for Normative Legal
Theory
Normative legal theory takes place in what Rawls calls the background culture, which he defines as “the culture of the social, not
of the political. It is the culture of daily life, of its many associations: churches and universities, learned and scientific societies,
and clubs and teams, to mention a few.”48
The ideal of public legal reason that applies to legal practice
should not apply directly to legal scholars when they debate and
discuss legal policies or normative legal theories. The phrase
“normative legal theory” is ambiguous. By “normative legal theory,” I mean to refer to a subset of legal scholarship (broadly understood) that evaluates the criteria of normative desirability for
law or that applies those criteria to particular questions of legal
policy. Paradigmatically, normative legal theory is practiced by legal academics, but lawyers and judges frequently engage in this
practice when they are “out of court,” metaphorically speaking.
The propositional content of normative legal theory and legal practice could be identical. That is, the very same normative reason
could be advanced either in a law review article or in a judicial
opinion. Of course, the propositional content may differ. High
normative legal theory—with explicit references to metaethics as
well as to moral and political philosophy—is almost never an explicit part of legal practice. The contrary proposition does not hold:
legal scholarship frequently includes doctrinal analysis identical to
that which occurs in judicial opinions.
The conclusion that normative legal theory should not be governed by the ideal of public legal reason that applies to legal practice is unsurprising and should not be controversial. Legal theorists
should be free to investigate the soundness of the ideal of public
legal reason. Moreover, normative legal theory may legitimately
consider hypothetical circumstances in which the fact of pluralism
does not obtain. In a possible world in which there is universal consensus that welfarism was true, there would be no reason to exclude the deep premises of welfarism from the ideal of public legal
reason. Of course, even in this possible world, nonpublic reasons
would remain: the partial or personal reasons of judges would still
48

Rawls, supra note 1, at 14.
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be proscribed by the norms that governed judicial deliberation and
opinion writing.
But even if the ideal of public legal reason appropriate to the actual world (in which the fact of pluralism does obtain) does not apply directly to normative legal theory and normative arguments
about legal policy, it does apply indirectly. I now turn to the argument for indirect restraint of normative legal theory.
3. The Relationship Between Normative Legal Theory and Legal
Practice
One of the important questions for normative legal theory bears
an extremely close relationship to legal practice. Sometimes normative legal theorists ask how judges should decide a particular
question of legal policy in the actual world, given the fact of pluralism. Indeed, this form of legal scholarship is ubiquitous—it dominates the law reviews and treatises. When normative legal theorists
take up this particular task, advising judges about what they should
do and what reasons they should give for doing it, they necessarily
assume those restraints for political morality that constrain those
whom they advise. In other words, normative legal theorists should
not advise judges to do something that would be improper given
the ideal of public legal reason that applies.
To be clear, my claim is not that legal theorists may not discuss
the ways in which nonpublic reasons bear on legal issues in the actual world. Legal theorists are free to discuss the implications of religious doctrines (such as Buddhism or Roman Catholicism) or
comprehensive moral doctrines (such as utilitarianism or Kantian
ethics) for particular issues of legal policy as they arise in the actual
world. Such discussion does not offend a duty of political morality
until and unless it crosses the line from theoretical discussion in the
background culture to advocacy, recommendation, or advice for
legal practice. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that the line between advocacy and advice on the one hand and theoretical discussion on the other will sometimes be fuzzy—many morally relevant
lines have this property. That lines are fuzzy does not mean they
cannot guide practice: intermediate cases can be resolved either by
careful deliberation about the particular context or by rules of
thumb that group recurring situations for reasons of practical convenience.
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Another clarification requires recalling the distinction between
positive and normative law and economics and then marking a distinction between two different claims that normative legal economists might make. Nothing in this account of an ideal of public legal reason suggests that legal economists should refrain from
scholarship that engages in the positive project of delineating the
consequences of various legal policy options for welfare. This enterprise is entirely unobjectionable—even though the definition of
welfare employed may be controversial if it were to serve in a
normative rather than a positive role. Within the project of normative law and economics, one must distinguish between two different claims that might be made. What one might call the strong welfarist claim would be the claim that only welfare should count for
the purpose of making legal policy. One can then distinguish what
might be called the weak welfarist claim—that welfare is one of the
factors that should be considered. Nothing in the ideal of public legal reason counsels against the weak welfarist claim. The idea that
preferences should be taken into account can easily be accommodated within an ideal of public reason, so long as the reason for
their relevance is not given in terms of a deep and controversial
premise of moral theory.
There is an objection to my account of the relationship between
normative legal theory and legal practice that deserves consideration at this point. Even assuming that the ideal of public legal reason that I have offered here is correct, one might argue that legal
theorists ought to convince legal practitioners to engage in dissimulation and deception. That is, one might take the position that the
role of legal theory is to advocate the best legal policies on the basis of the best (or true, or correct) reasons. If these reasons fail the
test of the ideal of public reason, then there is a further question: as
a matter of rhetoric (and not truth), can the best policy be justified
on the basis of public reasons? If the policy cannot be given a plausible justification with public legal reasons, then the legal theorist
should not advocate or recommend the policy. If, however, plausible public legal reasons are available, then the normative legal theory should advocate adoption of the policy on the basis of one set
of reasons, knowing that judges will need to justify the policy based
on a different set of reasons. Put baldly, the argument is that judges
should lie about the true reasons for their decisions.
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From a purely consequentialist perspective, the practice of judicial dissimulation will be justified so long as it produces good consequences. And it might be argued that dissimulation offers “the
best of both worlds,” that is, the advantages of reliance on the best
comprehensive moral or religious theory combined with perceived
legitimacy. There is, of course, the risk that legal practice will not
remain opaque. To the extent that the public becomes aware of a
practice of judicial dissimulation, this awareness might have a delegitimizing effect. For this reason, normative legal theorists would
be well advised not to openly advocate dissimulation. A variety of
techniques might be employed for the theorist to give oblique advice. For example, a theorist might argue on two fronts: (1) that a
particular legal policy is best on the basis of deep reasons; and (2)
that the same policy is justified by the best interpretation of the authoritative legal materials. That is, the theorist could offer judges a
formalist rationale for a result to be reached on the basis of purely
normative internal deliberation. Without naming names, it might
even be argued that some legal theorists do precisely this.
In other words, it could be argued that legal theorists should
themselves dissimulate by advocating or advising in ways that are
intentionally misleading or deceptive. Nothing that can be said in
this Essay is likely to change any minds about the wisdom or morality of lying. I can state my own position—that such lying would
violate duties of political morality and compromise personal integrity—but those who are not averse to dissimulation are unlikely to
place much credence in personal testimony. Some may even discount such testimony as mere “cheap talk.”49
E. Public Legal Reason, Welfarism, and Private Law
The context of private law has exemplary significance. Normative law and economics has been particularly influential in privatelaw fields.50 Although normative law and economics undoubtedly
has important contributions to make to public law, some public-law
49

On “cheap talk” in a different context, see Tom Ginsburg & Richard H.
McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute
Resolution, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1229, 1263–81 (2004).
50
See Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge
Guido Calabresi, 64 Md. L. Rev. 220, 227 (2005) (observing that most law and economics addresses private law).
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topics—including issues involving so-called “human” or “fundamental” rights—have received relatively little attention from legal
economists. Unlike private-law fields where law-and-economics
scholarship is certainly very important and arguably dominant, it
cannot be said that normative law and economics dominates public-law theory. For this reason, it is important to note that the ideal
of public legal reason applies fully to private legal practice. That is,
legal practitioners should not rely on the deep and controversial
premises of comprehensive religious or moral theories when they
decide private-law cases.
What are the implications of an ideal of public legal reason for
the debate between welfarism and fairness in the context of private
law? The implications of the discussion so far can be summarized
in the form of brief conclusions:
(1) The ideal of public legal reason applies to legal practice
within the domain of private law.
(2) The ideal of public legal reason does not require that welfarism be abandoned as a paradigm for normative legal theory as
practiced in the legal academy (or elsewhere in the background
culture).
(3) The ideal of public legal reason does not proscribe weak welfarist claims in the context of advocacy or advice to legal practitioners.
(4) The ideal of public legal reason does proscribe the strong
welfarist claim that welfarism is the only appropriate method for
the resolution of questions of legal policy within the domain of
private law.
(5) The ideal of public legal reason does allow the consideration
of reasons of fairness for the resolution of questions of legal policy within the domain of private law, provided that the reasons
are drawn from or supported by public values.
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F. Reflexive or Question Begging?
Before leaving this central Part of the Essay, I consider a final
objection. One might maintain that the argument made here is
question begging—that is, it assumes the conclusion that strong
welfarist claims are inappropriate for legal practices—when it lays
out the normative foundations of the ideal of public legal reason.
Certainly, one can imagine an account of public legal reason that
would be susceptible to this objection—all that would be required
would be the deployment of some deep anticonsequentialist premise in the argument for the ideal. But such an objection is wholly
inapplicable to the argument offered here, which refrains from
deep premises and relies only on public values.
This fact about the argument—that the justification for the ideal
of public legal reason relies on public reasons—points to an important feature of the case made here. It is reflexive—relying only on
premises that are acceptable to the theory of reasons offered by the
ideal. This reflexivity is not circularity, although, as is always the
case, circularity and reflexivity superficially share a certain structure. Reflexivity is a necessary property of good normative theories
of reasons. This point is easily demonstrated. If a theory of public
reason relied on nonpublic reasons for its justification, the theory
would be internally inconsistent.
The reflexivity of the justifications offered for a theory of public
reasons does not, however, mean that nonpublic reasons do not
have an important role to play in the discussion of such theories. In
the background culture—for example, in the legal academy—it is
perfectly appropriate to inquire whether the case for an ideal of
public reason can be made within the confines of particular comprehensive doctrines—whether they be religious or philosophical.
This task naturally takes a particular form within the scholarly enterprise of normative legal theory: legal theorists can inquire
whether the ideal of public legal reason is compatible with various
theories—deontological, consequentialist, and aretaic. To the extent that such a theory can be the focus of an overlapping consensus51 between such theories, both its foundations and potential for
stability are improved. To the extent that any particular compre51

See Rawls, supra note 1, at 133–72 (discussing the idea of an overlapping consensus).
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hensive doctrine cannot participate in such an overlapping consensus, two worries arise. For those who are tempted by the comprehensive doctrine but are also committed to the public values that
underwrite the ideal of public legal reason, their worry concerns
the coherence of their own views—inconsistency implies that
something must go. For those who are committed to the comprehensive doctrine but who do not share the public values, their
worry concerns the possibility of reconciling themselves to the political culture in which they live. Of course, reconciliation is not required for a satisfying life; a life of resistance or withdrawal can be
a life of integrity.
III. WELFARISM AT THE BAR OF PUBLIC LEGAL REASON
So far, the discussion of public legal reason has been abstract
and general. Let’s make the discussion a bit more concrete and
particular by applying it to a specific controversy in normative legal
theory—the fairness-versus-welfare debate as exemplified by the
claims made by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell.
A. Kaplow and Shavell’s Argument for Welfarism
Kaplow and Shavell have attempted to demonstrate that any
conceivable theory or method of policy evaluation that departs
from welfarism violates weak Pareto for some pair of possible
worlds. They believe that this argument is important because of the
great intuitive plausibility of weak Pareto, which merely states that
if we compare two possible worlds with counterpart individuals and
every individual is better off in one of these worlds, then that world
is better. Putting it another way, given a choice between two
courses of action, only one of which will improve the welfare of
each and every individual, then that course of action is the right
one.
Here is an example that illustrates the core idea of Kaplow and
Shavell’s argument. Suppose policies are evaluated on the basis of
fairness and not exclusively on the basis of welfare. For example, as
a matter of fairness, criminals should always be punished if they
deserve it, even when everyone would prefer that they not be punished. How might this happen? Of course, it is usually the case that
criminals will prefer not to be punished, and it is frequently the
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case that their friends and family would prefer they not be punished. It is easy to imagine a plausible case in which even the victim
would prefer mercy, and the police, prosecutors, judge, and jury all
wished they were not required to impose a punishment. Now imagine the (less plausible, but theoretically possible) case in which everyone prefers that the criminal not be punished. (Perhaps the case
is so celebrated that everyone in the world has formed an opinion
about it.) If society followed a principle that always required the
deserved punishment to be imposed, then everyone would be made
worse off—assuming that being better or worse off is a function of
individual preferences. Therefore, taking fairness into account in
punishment could result in making everyone worse off.52 If the
same person who affirms the weak Pareto principle as a true normative premise also believes that fairness should be considered in
evaluating legal policies, that individual is seemingly committed to
contradictory beliefs.
In their book Fairness versus Welfare, Kaplow and Shavell make
several arguments in favor of welfarism. In large part, Kaplow and
Shavell’s argumentative strategy is simply to remind legal analysts
that fairness is in tension with welfare. In other words, Kaplow and
Shavell remind their readers that fairness may require a sacrifice in
the total sum of welfare (or good consequences). This strategy will
appeal to readers with strong consequentialist intuitions, and it
may convince readers who have failed to appreciate the many ways
in which prioritizing fairness may require the acceptance of bad
consequences. But this argumentative strategy is unlikely to persuade legal analysts who accept the proposition that fairness is in
tension with welfare, but who nonetheless believe that fairness
should trump welfare, at least in certain conditions. To these readers, Kaplow and Shavell’s argument seems question begging.53 The
52

Although this brief example illustrates Kaplow and Shavell’s idea, it is not a rigorous presentation of their position. Many readers may see obvious objections to this
simplified version of their argument. In fairness to Kaplow and Shavell, their claims
should not be evaluated on the basis of my simplified version of their argument.
53
In fact, Kaplow and Shavell’s argument need not be interpreted as question begging. Rather, the charitable interpretation of their argument is that it employs the
method of reflective equilibrium. By eliciting considered judgments about particular
contexts in which fairness would lead to bad consequences, Kaplow and Shavell try to
undermine the more abstract judgment that fairness should sometimes (or always)
trump consequentialist considerations. In other words, Kaplow and Shavell are not
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argument made in the previous Part of this Essay suggests that
Kaplow and Shavell’s arguments are not good reasons within legal
practice to the extent that Kaplow and Shavell rely, either explicitly or implicitly, on deep consequentialist premises.
Kaplow and Shavell’s argument that fairness can violate weak
Pareto is of particular interest because it may provide them with a
public reason for affirming welfarism as the exclusive method for
the evaluation of legal policies. Kaplow and Shavell claim that it is
unreasonable (and perhaps even irrational) to prefer a possible
world that makes everyone worse off. Whether or not they say so
directly, their arguments seem to imply that their proof gives those
who adhere to an ideal of public legal reason a good and sufficient
reason to affirm welfarism. In other words, we can redescribe their
claim as the claim that they have convincing public reasons to affirm welfarism, and that these public reasons should convince rational or reasonable adherents of nonconsequentialist comprehensive moral doctrines.
B. Kaplow and Shavell’s Version of Welfarism
Kaplow and Shavell’s core idea is that we should evaluate legal
policies solely on the basis of their impact on human well-being or
“welfare.” This core idea implies that legal analysts54 should examine the consequences of those policies, but only if they affect welfare. This view is what Kaplow and Shavell call “welfarism.”
To understand Kaplow and Shavell’s claim, it is important to
note that it is a view about the evaluation of possible worlds; it is
not presented as an action-guiding theory. At first this distinction
may seem trivial because one might assume that Kaplow and Shavell believe that one ought to act so as to achieve the best possible
world. This is not the case, however, and this seemingly peculiar

trying to argue that welfare should trump fairness because the alternative would be
fairness at the price of welfare; instead, they are arguing that reasonable persons will
reevaluate their commitment to fairness once they understand the high price that
must be paid for that commitment.
54
“Legal analysts” are primarily legal academics, but this category includes social
scientists, policy analysts in think tanks, and others. Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (article), supra note 3, at 1306. Kaplow and Shavell contrast this group to
ordinary citizens and to policymakers (such as legislators and judges). Id. at 1305,
1318.
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feature of Kaplow and Shavell’s theory has substantial significance.
Kaplow and Shavell are very explicit that they are concerned with
the evaluation rather than the making of policy:
Although our thesis is that legal policy analysts should rely exclusively on welfare economics, the important role of internalized social norms suggests that the situation of legal decisionmakers, notably legislators, regulators, and judges, is more
complicated than that of legal policy analysts, who are mainly
academics. The reason is that legal decisionmakers must translate the advice of the analysts into policies for which the decisionmakers are generally accountable to ordinary citizens—and
55
citizens, in turn, may be more familiar with notions of fairness.

What are we to make of this claim? I will attempt to unpack the
various strands of thought in this brief passage. First, Kaplow and
Shavell tell us that “legal decisionmakers must translate the advice
of analysts into policies.” This passage makes it clear that welfarism does not directly guide action. Rather, they imagine a threestep process. In step one, the legal analyst utilizes welfarism to
evaluate policy options. In step two, the decisionmakers act on the
basis of this advice. The next portion of the passage, “for which the
decisionmakers are generally accountable to ordinary citizens—
and citizens, in turn, may be more familiar with notions of fairness,” suggests a third step. Decisionmakers may be required to
provide citizens with an explanation of their actions that differs
from the actual basis of the decision.
One should not, I think, place too much emphasis on the threestep process. This is a brief passage, and may not represent a fully
developed version of Kaplow and Shavell’s ideas. The core notion
expressed in the passage, however, is familiar from the history of
utilitarianism. Indeed, a view similar to that expressed by Kaplow
and Shavell has been given the derogatory label “governmenthouse utilitarianism.” Government-house utilitarianism is the view
that decisionmakers (who in the familiar British locution occupy
“government house”) ought to be utilitarians, whereas ordinary
people ought to adhere to a simpler set of moral norms (“internalized social norms,” in Kaplow and Shavell’s parlance). Kaplow and
55

Id. at 974.
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Shavell’s view might be called “ivory-tower welfarism,” as they
seem to believe the pure version of welfarism should only be practiced by “legal analysts,” that is, those who are employed by academic and similar institutions. Ivory-tower welfarism is practiced
only by those who do not make policy; in other words, it is a theory
of evaluation and not a theory of action. Ivory-tower welfarism
pushes the locus at which the true, correct, or deep explanations
are to be found from the government house to the ivory tower.
Another clarification concerns the sense in which Kaplow and
Shavell are welfarists. Kaplow and Shavell are welfarists, but they
are welfarists of a particular sort. They deploy a subjective interpretation of the concept of welfare. Kaplow and Shavell’s conception of welfare is based solely on individual preferences among
possible worlds or preference satisfaction. Recall that the form of a
1
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function is W(x) = F (U (x),
2
N
U (x), . . . U (x)). Kaplow-Shavell welfarism takes the form of a social-welfare function that evaluates only individual utility information.
C. An Informal Explication of the Kaplow-Shavell Proof
Having investigated Kaplow and Shavell’s version of welfarism,
we turn our attention to an explication of their proof that nonwelfarist methods of evaluation violate weak Pareto. The aim of Kaplow and Shavell’s proof is to show that any possible theory that includes fairness as a factor in the evaluation of legal policies can
yield the conclusion that we should prefer a policy that would
make everyone worse off, as compared to some alternative policy.
They offer both an informal and a formal version of the proof, but
both versions share the same general idea and the same strategy of
proof. In this Essay I focus on the informal version of the proof;
elsewhere, I argue that the formal version is invalid in the technical
sense that the conclusion of the argument does not follow from its
premises.56
The general idea of Kaplow and Shavell’s proof is that for any
nonwelfarist theory of evaluation, T, there is at least one pair of
56
See Lawrence B. Solum, Of Pareto and Possible Worlds: A Critique of Kaplow
and Shavell’s Argument for Welfarism (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association).

SOLUM_BOOK

1490

10/22/2006 3:51 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 92:1449

possible worlds, P and Q, such that T evaluates P as superior to Q,
but each and every individual prefers Q to P. It follows that any
nonwelfarist T can violate weak Pareto. Any welfarist theory of
evaluation T must comply with weak Pareto because by definition
all such theories are social welfare functions that (1) consider only
individual welfare information, (2) consider that information
anonymously, and (3) are increasing functions of individual welfare.
As I have presented it, the general idea of Kaplow and Shavell’s
proof omits a crucial element. How do they show that for nonwelfarist theory T there is a pair of possible worlds such that T violates
weak Pareto? Kaplow and Shavell’s basic argumentative strategy is
to offer examples that can be generalized so as to apply to every
possible nonwelfarist theory. In their informal proof, they use examples that employ an assumption of symmetry. For example, they
explore the effect of a rule that requires tort compensation for negligence on fairness grounds in a world where everyone inflicts exactly the same negligent injuries as they suffer. In this possible
world, compensation injures everyone. In their formal proof, they
employ an example that simply assumes that everyone is indifferent to fairness and then introduces the possibility that achieving
fairness imposes a cost. In other words, if for any principle of fairness there is a pair of possible worlds in which everyone is indifferent to fairness, but fairness imposes costs that everyone prefers not
to incur, then complying with any principle of fairness can violate
weak Pareto.
The informal proof establishes that some nonwelfarist theories
can violate weak Pareto. Kaplow and Shavell believe that the formal version of the proof establishes that all nonwelfarist theories
violate weak Pareto in certain particular circumstances. This is because the informal version of the proof relies on symmetrical imposition of injuries and the costs of compensation in order to generate
the example. Kaplow and Shavell do not attempt to argue that
every possible nonwelfarist theory suffers from the symmetry problem. In the formal version of the proof, they simply assume that
there is “a good such that, if each person has δ more of it, then
each person is better off.”57 They then claim that with respect to
57

Kaplow & Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method, supra note 2, at 283.
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any nonwelfarist method of evaluation, there will always be a triplet of possible worlds X, Y, and Z such that the nonwelfarist
method of evaluation prefers X to Y—for whatever reason is relevant to the theory. Kaplow and Shavell then claim that it will always be possible to identify Z, a possible world that is identical to
Y, except that in Z, each and every person has δ more of the good
that will make “each person better off.” The nonwelfarist theory
will claim that X is preferred to Z, but everyone is better off in Z
than in X. This violates the weak Pareto principle because that
principle states that a possible world in which everyone is better off
is to be preferred for that reason.
D. Weak Pareto Fails the Test of Public Legal Reason
Does Kaplow and Shavell’s proof provide a public reason for affirming welfarism? The weak Pareto principle is the normative
linchpin of their argument. Recall that the weak Pareto principle
can be expressed as follows: “It is never the case that a possible
world P that makes everyone worse off as compared to possible
world Q is better than Q.” If weak Pareto provides a public legal
reason, and if all of the premises of Kaplow and Shavell’s proof are
true and the proof is valid, it would follow that Kaplow and Shavell’s argument would provide both legal scholars and judges a good
reason to be welfarists.
From the point of view of an ideal of public legal reason, the issue is whether weak Pareto is the kind of principle that is accessible to all reasonable citizens. Rawls himself seemed to limit the
normative resources of public reason to public political values—
values that can be drawn from the public political culture such as
the fundamental equality of citizens. The weak Pareto principle is
not that kind of value. Weak Pareto is a technical economic principle. Although weak Pareto is familiar to economists and some
moral and political philosophers, it is almost unknown to citizens
outside the academy. It certainly is not the kind of principle that is
widely accepted by the public at large.
But this does not settle the matter. I have already established
that novel reasons can be public reasons if they are publicly accessible.58 Weak Pareto seems to rest on an intuitively plausible and
58
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noncontroversial idea—that it can never be a good idea to make
everyone worse off. Even those who are unsympathetic to maximizing theories such as utilitarianism might be willing to assent to
weak Pareto. Indeed, weak Pareto has the ring of an obvious truth
or tautology. Why? Because if the only description of a choice
available is that the choice violates weak Pareto, one would assume
that the universal welfare loss would be senseless—that is, violation of weak Pareto seems to imply incurring a cost without reason.
But the intuitive plausibility of weak Pareto cannot be sustained
once the full content of the weak Pareto principle is made fully explicit. The form of weak Pareto that garners very wide acceptance
is something like “it is never right to make everyone worse off.”
This form is different from “it is never right to act in a way that is
contrary to everyone’s preferences.” Given the fact of pluralism,
different citizens will understand “worse off” differently. Weak
Pareto is intuitively plausible only until one specifies a conception
of welfare. Once the conception is specified, then its accessibility
becomes limited to those who share the conception.
Moreover, many citizens are likely to reject preferencesatisfaction as the best conception of individual well-being. The objections to the preference view are well known. For example, many
persons have preferences that are inconsistent with their own objective self-interests. Some people prefer to eat rich food, even
though it is bad for their health. Some prefer to gamble, even
though it will impoverish their families. Some prefer to drink intoxicating beverages, even though they will damage their livers.
Once the ambiguity in weak Pareto is exposed, Kaplow and
Shavell’s own argument can be run against them. That is, if one
takes only preference satisfaction into account in evaluating possible worlds, one could prefer a world in which everyone’s objective
well-being was injured. To the extent that many of Kaplow and
Shavell’s readers will affirm a conception of well-being that is not
based solely on preference satisfaction, Kaplow and Shavell claim
to have a form of argument that should convince the reader to reject their own theory. Indeed, one might ask Kaplow and Shavell if
they would accept the principle that one should never prefer a possible world in which everyone suffers substantial damage to his objective well-being, including health, mental abilities, and resources.
If they accept this proposition, then, by their own rationale, their
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affirmance of welfarism is unreasonable. If they reject this proposition, one might ask them for an explanation as to why they reject it.
E. Kaplow and Shavell Rely on Dubious Modal Assumptions
It is quite striking that Kaplow and Shavell begin their proof
with three premises that define the set of all possible worlds. Their
own statement of their proof begins with the following three sentences:
(1) Let x denote a complete description of the world.
(2) In particular, x includes a comprehensive account of each of n
individuals’ situations and of anything that might be relevant under any method of evaluating the state of the world.
(3) Let X be the set of all conceivable states of the world.

59

This is no accident. The crucial work in Kaplow and Shavell’s proof
is performed by implicit modal assumptions—that is, by unstated
assumptions about what is possible. When Kaplow and Shavell
claim that we can always posit a possible world where everyone
gets enough of some good to make them better off, they are making a modal claim.
Possibility is a very tricky concept because any claim about possibility is potentially ambiguous. “Possible” in what sense? The
possibility problem with Kaplow and Shavell’s argument is that
once this question is answered, it both undermines the value of the
proof and poses consistency problems for Kaplow and Shavell.
How can one get a handle on possibility? One tool for removing
ambiguity about possibility is possible-worlds semantics.60 The modal assertion “H is possible” translates into the statement “H is
true in some possible world.” In other words, if I say “it is possible
that Morse is a Yankees fan,” that translates into “Morse is a Yankees fan in some possible world.”
Possible-worlds semantics allows one to distinguish the various
senses in which one says that “H is possible” or “J could have happened.” For example, take the broadest notion of possibility, logi59
60
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cal possibility. “J is logically possible” translates to “J is true in at
least one possible world—that is, in at least one world in which
there are no logical contradictions.” Logicians and philosophers
use the word “accessibility” to define sets of possible worlds with
respect to various senses of possibility. Thus, the possible worlds in
which there are no logical contradictions are logically accessible.
The possible worlds that obey the laws of science are nomologically accessible. The possible worlds that are consistent with everything that we know are epistemologically accessible. The possible
worlds that share the history of the world up to the present moment are historically accessible. The possible world that we now
inhabit is the actual world. The worlds that are historically accessible from the actual world are the possible worlds that share the history of the actual world up until now. Worlds that are both historically and nomologically accessible share both the history of the
actual world and its natural laws.
Kaplow and Shavell’s proof relies on several implicit assertions
about possibility. The most important of these is contained in the
following premise of their original proof: “Construct x’’ from x’ by
increasing each mi in x’ by a positive amount δ.”61 (The variables x’’
and x’ name possible worlds.) This locution is the means by which
Kaplow and Shavell express the claim that for any nonwelfarist
theory, there is at least one triplet of possible worlds, X, Y, and Z,
such that Z is identical to Y except that in Z, each and every individual receives an amount δ of some good that suffices to make one
better off. What sense of possibility is involved in this implicit modal claim?
The first sense of possibility is logical possibility. This sense is
suggested by Kaplow and Shavell’s reference to “the set of all conceivable states of the world.” Although logical possibility would allow Kaplow and Shavell’s proof to go through, it creates other intractable problems for them. Once Kaplow and Shavell deploy
logical possibility in their proof, they then become committed to
the proposition that normative theories must hold for all logically
possible worlds. But this proposition sanctions a whole host of arguments against welfarism. For example, there is a pair of logically
possible worlds, one in which innocent children are tortured to sat61
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isfy sadists and one in which they are not, such that a given consequentialist theory (for example, utilitarianism) evaluates the world
in which the children are tortured as preferable to the world in
which they are not tortured. This case is one of a parade of horribles used in a standard set of objections against utilitarianism. Kaplow and Shavell reject the use of these examples as unrealistic;62
that is, they argue that welfarist theories need only produce plausible results in “realistic” possible worlds, where “realistic” rules out
possible worlds that do not satisfy unspecified accessibility conditions.
Suppose then, that Kaplow and Shavell limit themselves to what
we can call “practical” possibility. They might, for example, consider only those possible worlds that are historically and nomologically accessible—possible worlds that share the history of the actual world up to now and that obey the laws of science. Now,
however, there is a problem with Kaplow and Shavell’s proof. The
third possible world in their proof is not historically and nomologically accessible. Recall that Z is identical to Y, the world in which
some nonwelfarist consideration, such as punishing the guilty, is
satisfied, except that in Y, each and every individual gets some
good that each and every individual would prefer to receive.
Where does this good come from? How is it possible that everyone
in the whole world would prefer to receive more of this good? How
could complying with a fairness principle (for example, by punishing one person) cause everyone in the world to lose some quantity
of the good? Once we confine ourselves to practical possibilities, it
is not clear that one could find even a single violation of weak
Pareto—much less show that every nonwelfarist theory can violate
weak Pareto. This conclusion bears repeating: it is not clear that
Kaplow and Shavell can show that any fairness theory violates weak
Pareto for historically and nomologically accessible possible worlds.
How could Kaplow and Shavell deal with the possibility problem? Perhaps they can specify a sense of possibility that cuts off the
cases that are damaging to welfarism but preserves violations of
weak Pareto for every nonwelfarist theory. This seems a daunting
task, but even if they are able to accomplish it, they must show that
the specified sense of possibility is of normative significance—that
62
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it is morally relevant. It will not do for them to choose some arbitrary sense of possibility that does their dirty work. They must
show that the sense of possibility that validates their position is not
simply a post hoc fix for the possibility problem. I pose this as a
challenge to Kaplow and Shavell, but, to be frank, I cannot conceive of a way in which they could meet the challenge. We may
someday find that a small population of dodos still survives. With
that caveat in mind, one might say that Kaplow and Shavell’s proof
is “dead as a dodo”—the proof does not have “live” significance
for the fairness-versus-welfare debate. There is, of course, another
sense in which the possibility problem is no problem at all for Kaplow and Shavell: to the extent that their modal claim is about logical possibility, the proof is valid but uninteresting.
F. The Misdescription of Deontology
Kaplow and Shavell make a subtle but important assumption
about the nature of deontological or fairness-based principles.
Kaplow and Shavell assume that the world is divided between two
sorts of theories, welfarist theories that evaluate possible worlds in
terms of individual utility information considered anonymously,
and nonwelfarist theories that evaluate possible worlds by considering information other than individual utility information. This assumption is either incorrect or misleading.
Consider the set of normative theories that we call deontological. Deontological theories operate on the basis of moral rules such
as “do not break your promises,” “do not kill innocent persons,”
and so forth. That is, deontological theories impose constraints on
actions or omissions by agents. Nonwelfarist social-evaluation
functions operate on possible worlds and not on actions. A nonwelfarist social-evaluation function might result in the following judgment: “A possible world in which a promise is broken should receive negative ten evaluation points as compared to a possible
world that is otherwise identical, but in which the promise is kept.”
Deontological theories do not fit the mold of nonwelfarist
evaluation functions. Nonwelfarist evaluation functions operate on
possible worlds. They look at the consequences of actions from an
impartial point of view, and hence they are ill-equipped for the
task of constraining agents. Deontological theories look at actions
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from the point of view of an agent or actor, and hence they are illequipped for the task of evaluating possible worlds.
In other words, Kaplow and Shavell are comparing apples and
oranges. They are attempting to compare an approach to evaluating possible worlds with an approach to evaluating actions. These
two different kinds of theories answer different kinds of questions.
To compare them directly is to commit a category mistake, an
egregious conceptual error.
There is, however, a way to compare welfarism with deontological theories. A theory that evaluates possible worlds can be compared to a theory that evaluates actions by a simple process of conceptual transmogrification. Thus, we can transform any particular
theory encompassed by welfarism into a theory of action. For example, act-utilitarianism is the theory that says one should choose
the action that will produce the greatest level of utility, as compared to the available alternative courses of action. For Kaplow
and Shavell, the greatest level of utility could be operationalized as
the classical utilitarian social-welfare function.
As demonstrated above, however, Kaplow and Shavell do not
choose this route to creating comparability between welfarist consequentialism and deontology. They are explicit in stating that welfarism is a theory for analysts and not for policymakers. Rather
than transform a theory that evaluates possible worlds into a theory that evaluates actions, they attempt the reverse—transforming
a deontological theory into a theory for the evaluation of possible
worlds. Kaplow and Shavell fail, however, to see that this transformation distorts deontology. “Killing of innocents is forbidden”
does not mean the same thing as “a possible world in which killing
of innocents happens rates ten points lower than a possible world
in which killing of innocents does not happen, ceteris paribus.” By
forcing deontological theories into a consequentialist straightjacket, Kaplow and Shavell distort the theories’ essential meaning.
Kaplow and Shavell now have some fancy footwork to do. They
might try casting their version of welfarism as a theory of policymaking. Then, they could argue that welfarist approaches to policymaking cannot violate weak Pareto in the sense that such approaches cannot lead to a choice that makes everyone worse off.
Kaplow and Shavell then would conclude that deontological approaches to policymaking could violate weak Pareto, leading to a
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policy choice that does make everyone worse off. At that point,
however, Kaplow and Shavell will run into a brick wall. They cannot prove that every conceivable deontological theory of policymaking can violate weak Pareto, as is easily established by the following example. Imagine the following, highly simplified,
deontological theory of policymaking:
Make policy in accord with the following triplet of lexically ordered rules:
(1) Never make a policy that will result in making everyone
worse off.
(2) If (1) is satisfied, select that policy that will maximize the
sphere of equal and adequate liberties guaranteed to each individual.
(3) If (1) and (2) are satisfied, select the policy that will produce
the best consequences.

Conformity to this theory guarantees zero tolerance for weak
Pareto violations because avoidance of such violations is built into
the first principle.
Howard Chang made a very similar criticism of Kaplow and
Shavell,63 and their reply to him64 works only if they are allowed to
redescribe deontology as consequentialism. Of course, Kaplow and
Shavell can claim that they never intended to compare welfarism
with fairness theories. They can say that their argument is only intended to compare theories for the evaluation of possible worlds
and is not intended to cast doubt on deontological theories such as
Kant’s. This move would, however, open them to the charge that
they are arguing against a straw man. Moreover, it would not save
their proof, because, as I have demonstrated, one can construct a
nonwelfarist theory of evaluating possible worlds that does not violate weak Pareto.
Kaplow and Shavell’s misdescription of deontology is a very serious conceptual flaw in their defense of welfarism. This misde63

Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the
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scription reflects a category mistake at the core of their thinking,
and correction of that mistake would require them to give up the
claim that their proof is relevant to the fairness-versus-welfare debate—insofar as that debate is about live positions in normative legal theory (as opposed to hypothetical positions that Kaplow and
Shavell have themselves created).
G. The Preference Assumption
The final difficulty with Kaplow and Shavell’s argument lies in
an assumption they make about preferences. This assumption is
well hidden in their proof, and it will take some explication to bring
it out. In their own statement of their proof, they state: “If F is not
an individualistic social welfare function, we know from the observation that there exist x, x’ ∈ X such that Ui(x) = Ui(x’) for all i and
F(x) ≠ F(x’).”65
In other words, Kaplow and Shavell are assuming that on the basis of some fairness (nonwelfarist) consideration, one possible
world is rated higher than another, but every individual is indifferent between the two worlds. The hidden assumption is that no one
cares about the fairness (nonwelfarist) consideration. This point
bears repetition: Kaplow and Shavell’s proof assumes that no one
in the whole universe prefers the fair possible world to the unfair
possible world.
This assumption is crucial, and Kaplow and Shavell cannot reformulate the proof to work around it. If even one person cares
more about fairness than about the imaginary good introduced in
their proof, then it cannot be the case that the fairness (nonwelfarist) theory leads to a violation of weak Pareto. The one person
who cares more about fairness than the hypothetical consumer
good would be better off in the world where fairness is respected.
And if even one person prefers fairness to welfare, ranking the fair
world as preferable to the unfair world does not violate weak
Pareto.
Kaplow and Shavell would likely concede this point. They see it
as a virtue of their view that it allows fairness to be incorporated,
but only to the extent that persons have a taste for fairness. But
when the point is considered from a first-person perspective, the
65
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hidden assumption that no one cares about fairness begins to look
like a vice rather than a virtue. Moral theories are theories about
what preferences one ought to have. What should I value more
highly, fairness in punishment or an extra share of some consumer
good? Some moral theories may be neutral on this question, but
others are not. Some moral theories say that we ought to care more
about fundamental fairness than about consumption of nonessential items.
If you are reasoning about which moral theory you should adopt
and hence which preferences you ought to adopt, how would you
react to Kaplow and Shavell’s argument, given the hidden assumption? Kaplow and Shavell tell you that if you reject a theory that
would lead one to value fairness more than welfare, then the theory
you reject might lead to the conclusion that we ought to make everyone worse off. However, if you do decide to value fairness more
than welfare, then the theory you adopt cannot lead to the conclusion that we ought to make everyone worse off—because at least
one person, you, will prefer that we do justice rather than that we
give everyone a little more of some consumer good. In other
words, from the first-person perspective, Kaplow and Shavell’s argument is question begging. As Kaplow and Shavell elegantly put
it, each of us must judge the case of fairness versus welfare. It is no
argument at all to claim, as they do, that if everyone has already
decided in favor of welfare, then it would make everyone worse off
to decide in favor of fairness. This is a deep problem with Kaplow
and Shavell’s argument; once the problem is exposed, it becomes
clear that their proof is utterly irrelevant to the fairness-versuswelfare debate.
CONCLUSIONS: WELFARE AND FAIRNESS AS PUBLIC LEGAL
REASONS
I now return to my central claim: normative legal practice should
employ the resources of “public legal reason,” understood as legal
reasons that are accessible by all reasonable citizens. For the purposes of this Essay, I illustrated the flip side of that claim by discussing a particular theory, welfarism, and a particular argument
for welfarism, Kaplow and Shavell’s “proof.” But the critical implications of the argument for public legal reason are not limited to
Kaplow and Shavell, welfarism, or even consequentialism in gen-
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eral. Any normative legal theory that claims to guide legal practice
and relies on deep premises that are not accessible to reasonable
citizens faces the same general problem—whether it be legal deontology, law as integrity, or something else. Nonetheless, the examination of Kaplow and Shavell has exemplary significance because
the totalitarian ambitions of their project are so close to the surface.
Kaplow and Shavell chose to title their book Fairness versus
Welfare. Some readers might suggest as a revised title “Philosophy
versus Economics.” Both titles are mistakes because they suggest
that the answer to the fundamental question of normative legal
theory must be a deep theory—either deontology or welfarism or
something else. But this does not dissolve the fundamental question of normative legal theory: what moral theory should guide the
study of law? The answer to that question is complex. When the
study of law is limited to the background culture, including the legal academic culture, the answer is that any normative legal theory
is fair game, so far as public reason is concerned.
But when legal theorists seek to advise policymakers, then normative legal theory is properly constrained by public legal reason.
Under those circumstances, the deep premises of comprehensive
moral and philosophical doctrines should be excluded from normative legal theory. This means that the deep premises of both deontology and welfarism are properly excluded from the domain of
practical normative legal theory. But the exclusion of deep premises is not the same as exclusion tout court. Both deontology and
welfarism can offer public legal reasons as counsel to lawyers,
judges, and legislators. These public legal reasons are, of course,
quite familiar to the contemporary legal academy—they are the
reasons of policy and principle that are the bread and butter of
midlevel legal theory. In this way, the ideal of public legal reason
supports both welfare and fairness, but denies the claim of either to
exclude the other.
Law’s justifications should rely on normative principles that are
accessible to reasonable citizens, whether they are theists or atheists, deontologists or consequentialists, moral philosophers or
economists. Law’s deliberations should be shallow and not deep.
Law’s reason should be public.

